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Two conceptions of norms
Riccardo Guastini
 
1 The so-called “ontological problem” of norms
1 According to Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin,1 the history of legal philosophy is
criss-crossed by two competing conceptions of norms, that they name the “hyletic” (i.e.,
semantic) and the “expressive” (i.e., pragmatic) conception respectively.2 Each of them
has different implications for the relationship between norms and logic.3
2 (1) On the hyletic conception, norms are semantic, proposition-like, entities. Both, norms
and propositions are meanings, i.e., purely “abstract” entities. While propositions are the
meaning-contents of cognitive or descriptive sentences, norms are the meaning-contents
of prescriptive (normative, directive) sentences.4
3 (2) On the expressive conception, norms are pragmatic entities, since they are the output
or result of prescriptive speech acts.5 The nature of such an output, however, is far from
clear. It seems that the word “normative” could refer only to certain speech acts, not to
their products that have nothing specifically normative about them, and whose nature is
not well defined.6
4 According to Alchourrón and Bulygin’s presentation, these two conceptions claim to offer
a solution – two incompatible solutions, indeed – to one and the same problem: in von
Wright’s language, “the ontological problem of norms”.7
5 On a closer view, the so-called “ontological problem of norms” seems to be a conjunction
of two different (and partially independent) problems:8
(i) determining the conditions for the existence of a norm,
(ii) determining what kind of entity a norm is.
6 Both problems are by and large discussed in the works of von Wright, Alchourrón, and
Bulygin, as well as Kelsen, Klug, and Ross. Obviously, the first problem concerns what
could be labelled as a “genetic” issue, that is, the process of the production of norms: how
are  norms  “born”,  how  do  they  come  into  existence?  The  second  problem,  on  the
Two conceptions of norms
Revus, 35 | 2018
1
contrary, raises an issue concerning the product itself: what kind of entity is the product
of the process of the production of norms?9
7 The first  question seems to admit two (and maybe only two) competing answers:  (a)
norms acquire existence because of some kind of fact; (b) norms exist independently of
whatever empirical fact.10
8 The second question too seems to admit two alternative answers, prima facie independent
of the preceding ones: (a) norms are sentences;11 (b) norms are the meaning-contents of
sentences.12 
9 It seems to me that each of the two conceptions, as pictured by Alchourrón and Bulygin,
responds to one of the questions underlying “the ontological problem of norms”, but not
the  other.  At  any  rate,  none  of  them  responds  satisfactorily  to  both  questions.  In
particular,  the  pragmatic  conception is  related to  the  “genesis”  of  norms,  while  the
semantic one is related to their nature.
10 If I am right, then, after all, the two conceptions are not necessarily incompatible.13
 
2 The genesis of norms
11 The subject of the pragmatic conception is the process of production of norms, but – at
least according to Alchourrón and Bulygin’s formulation – it has nothing to say about the
nature (the “ontology”) of the product.14
12 In the Italian language (but the same holds for other languages) the word “comando”
(command) can refer, depending on the context, to either the act of commanding or the
content of such an act, i.e., what is commanded.15 There is no such ambiguity, on the
contrary, in the usage of word “norm”: a norm is the content, result, or product of a
normative act (a norm-producing act); nobody would name “norm” the normative act as
such.16 A norm is one thing, a norm-formulating act is quite another thing.
13 This is why a norm cannot be identified sic et simpliciter with a speech act. It is quite
plausible, rather, to identify a norm with the result of a speech act: namely, a normative
speech act, i.e., the act of formulating a norm.17
14 However, it seems a matter of course that the product – and the “means of production” at
the same time – of a speech act is but a linguistic entity in the strict sense (a syntactic, not
semantic entity), that is, a sentence – although supposedly a meaningful sentence.
15 From this standpoint, norms are but meaningful sentences. Until now, however, nothing
has been said about these particular meanings and the nature of meanings in general.
16 On the one hand, we did not exclude the existence of prescriptive meanings (i.e., norms,
assumedly neither true nor false) side by side with descriptive meanings (i.e., true or false
propositions) and maybe other kinds of meanings.18
17 On the  other  hand,  we  did  not  assume any ontological  commitment  concerning  the
nature  of  meanings.  One  can  simply  maintain  meanings  to  be  not  entities,  but
relationships  (dyadic  predicates),  namely,  the  relations  of  synonymy  between  two
sentences, the interpreting sentence and the interpreted.19
18 Especially  in  the  legal  domain,  one  must  distinguish  between  sentences  and  their
meanings.20 The reason why, however, is not that sentences and meanings are entities of
different kinds – the reason is that there is no one-to-one relationship between them,
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since a given (ambiguous) sentence can express more (alternative) meanings, one and the
same meaning can be expressed by two or more (synonymous) sentences, and so forth.21
19 In reference to legal norms, Scarpelli wrote:22
[W]e could paradoxically say that norms do not exist, they do not exist as separate
entities,  independent  of  interpreting  processes.  A  norm is  but  the  result  of  an
interpreting process,  it  can be expressed in no other way than ascribing it  to a
sentence or set of sentences. 
20 Remark, however, that no interpretation is possible without something to interpret –
there are no meanings without meaning-bearers. 
 
3 The nature of norms
21 The subject of the semantic conception, in turn, is the product of the norm creating
process; it says nothing about the process itself, and that is not accidental.
22 On the contrary,  this is  because such a conception is usually (although contingently)
coupled  with  the  (strictly  metaphysical)  tenet  that  meanings,  e.g.,  propositions,  are
abstract entities whose existence is completely independent of the sentences that express
them,23 in such a way that meanings are not the products of any processes of production –
they exist independently of whatever process.24
23 In  fact,  according  to  a  widespread  idea,  propositions  have  a  completely  a-temporal
existence, independent of their actual formulation. In the sense that, e.g., the proposition
that the earth turns around the sun was true before anyone formulated it, and since it is
true, it would be true even if no one ever formulated it. 
24 It seems to me, however, that this view confuses the existence of a proposition with its
truth-value. Sure, the proposition that the earth turns around the sun was true before
Nicolaus Copernicus. But in what sense did it “exist” before Copernicus? In no sense at all,
I submit.25
25 Perhaps this view supposes a counter-intuitive concept of existence. In common parlance,
we use “existent” (real, not abstract, not imaginary) to refer to any entity capable of
causally interacting with the world. I see no plausible reason to depart from this common
usage.26 A proposition exists if, and only if, it was actually formulated. 27 Once more: no
meanings without meaning-bearers.28
26 At any rate, even if this view were plausible for propositions, it cannot be applied to
norms,  unless  one accepts  some form of  “normative  cognitivism”,  i.e.,  the  idea  that
norms depend (not on acts of will, but) on acts of cognition.29
27 From the standpoint of (ethical and legal) non-cognitivism,30 norms are human artefacts:
they are “made” by people, not “given” to them.31 As a consequence, no moral or legal
norm exists without a norm-creating act. There are no norms if nobody “posited” (or at
least formulated32) them. “No imperative without an imperator”.33 Echoing Bulygin, the
existence of “whatever norm [...] is contingent”.34 
28 As far as legal norms are concerned, the widely accepted view in modern legal thinking,
since Bentham and Austin, is that norms only exist when, and only when, someone – the
“sovereign”, or a delegated authority – created or promulgated them. In other words,
generally  speaking,  modern  legal  thinking  assumes  a  pragmatic  conception  of  legal
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norms  or,  better,  of  their  genesis:  the  existence  of  any  norm  depends  on  a  norm-
producing act.35
 
4 An eclectic view
29 As  I  said,  if  this  is  correct,  then  the  two  conceptions  of  norms  are  not  necessarily
incompatible.36 It makes sense maintaining that norms are meanings and, nonetheless,
that they acquire existence only through speech-acts. 
30 From this standpoint: 
(a) norms are the meanings of sentences used to prescribe (semantic conception), but at
the same time
(b) no norm exists without a sentence expressing it (pragmatic conception). 
31 Thus,  a  norm is  a  proposition-like entity not  in the sense that  it  has  an a-temporal
existence,37 but  only  in  the  sense  that  norms,  just  like  propositions,  should  not  be
confused  with  the  sentences  that  express  them.  A  norm  is  nothing  other  than  the
meaning of a sentence,38 therefore an interpreted sentence39 or, if you prefer, the result of
the interpretation40 of a sentence.41
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NOTES
1. Alchourrón & Bulygin 1997, 1981, 1984 and 1989. See also Bulygin 1988.
2. I find Alchourrón and Bulygin’s terminology (“hylétic” vs. “expressive” where the first
term derives ethimologically from Greek “hyle” or matter, via Husserl’s phenomenology)
obscure. It seems to me that the opposition “semantic vs. pragmatic” can substitute that
terminology  without  any  loss  of  sense.  Cf.  González  Lagier  2001:  62  ss.  The  two
conceptions are discussed by Ferrer Beltrán & Rodríguez 2011: 30 ss. 
3. I do not deal with such implications in this paper. Moreover, I do not deal with the
relationships between conceptions of norms and conceptions of legal cognition, which
are discussed in Troper 1989.
4. This view is widespread within Italian analytical legal philosophy of 20th century. See, 
e.g.,  Scarpelli  1953:  ch.  I;  Bobbio  1958:  ch.  III;  Tarello  1974:  part  II.  These  authors
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distinguish  between  “descriptive  propositions”  (i.e.,  propositions  tout  court)  and
“prescriptive propositions” (understood not as propositions about norms, but as norms). 
5. Cf., e.g., von Wright 1963: 116 ss). See also Searle 1969 and, most of all, Kelsen 1981
[1962], 1989 [1965] and 1991. Cf. also Ross 1982 [1941].
6. According to the pragmatic conception, the semantic content of a prescriptive act is
but a proposition.  However,  norms cannot be seriously identified with (true or false)
propositions.
7. Von Wright 1963: 107.
8. Partially independent, since the solution of the second problem necessarily conditions
the solution of  the  first  one (and probably  vice  versa).  For  example,  if  norms are  a-
temporal entities, asking for their genesis does not make sense. 
9. A suggestion in this sense can be read in Mendonca 2012.
10. The first answer is connected with legal positivism, while the second is connected
with (some) natural law doctrines. 
11. In this context, the term “sentence” is used not in the sense of sentence type, but in the
sense  of  sentence  token (more  precisely,  one  should  say  “utterance”,  inasmuch  as  a
sentence is, strictly speaking, a class of utterances). 
12. See Alchourrón and Bulygin (1989) who distinguish “norm-communication” (which
presupposes that there is a relation between normative authority and the addressee),
“norm-prescription”  (which  corresponds  to  an  assertion),  and  “norm-lekton”  (which
corresponds  to  a  proposition).  Conte  (1980)  offers  four  concepts  of  norm:  deontic
sentence (that is, a sentence type), deontic utterance (a sentence token), deontic proposition
(which  corresponds  to  a  proposition),  and  deontic  status  (which  is  the  normative
correspondent of a fact or a state of affairs, that is, of the reference of a proposition).
Ferrer Beltrán and Rodríguez (2011: 35) distinguish four conceptions of norms: syntactic
(norms  as  sentences),  semantic  (norms  as  meanings),  syntactic-semantic  (norms  as
interpreted sentences),  and pragmatic (norms as the result of the prescriptive use of
language). 
13. The two conceptions are not incompatible as conceptions of norms. I do not discuss
the issue of whether they are incompatible from the point of view of deontic logic. By the
way,  as  stated  by  Searle  (1969:  ch.  2),  the  semantic  and  the  pragmatic  analyses  of
language are not incompatible, but complementary.
14. According to Troper (1989: 53) such a product is but a command. 
15. Mendonca 2012: 124.
16. Guastini 1989. Many misunderstandings concerning the relationships between law
and  logic  depend  precisely  on  the  non-distinction  between  speech  acts  and  their
products. See, e.g., Kelsen 1989 and 1991; Ferrajoli 2007. See Gianformaggio 1987. Logical
rules  apply  –  if they  do  –  to  the  language  of  law,  to  norms  (or,  more  plausibly,  to
propositions  about  the  satisfaction  or  “doability”  of  norms).  They  do  not  apply  to
normative acts, which are facts. Logic rules language, not the world. Moreover, deducing
is not deciding. Cf. von Wright 1991. 
17. I  am talking about norms in general,  not about legal norms. In the legal domain,
things are more complicated: formulating a norm is not sufficient to “introduce” it into a
legal system. 
18. For example, questions, requests, promises. 
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19. Hernández Marín 1999. The relations of synonymy, however, are not independent of
interpretation;  rather  they  are  the  result  of  interpretation  –  they  are  “made”  (by
interpreters), not “given” (to them). 
20. That is, between the sentences (the legal “provisions”) contained in the legal sources
and the norms which are derived from them by means of interpretation. 
21. Cf.,  e.g.,  Alchourrón  &  Bulygin  2007:  218  ss.  However,  the  distinction  between
sentences and meanings (especially between normative sentences and norms) is a topos of
the theory of interpretation. See Tarello1974: part II; Guastini 2011 and 2014a: ch. IV.
22. Scarpelli 1985: 570. 
23. Alchourrón  &  Bulygin  1981:  96:  “In  this  conception,  norms  are  not  language-
dependent;  they  can  only  be  expressed  by  linguistic  means,  but  their  existence  is
independent  of  any  linguistic  expression.  There  are  norms  that  have  not  yet  been
formulated in any language and that perhaps will never be formulated. A norm is, in this
view, an abstract, purely conceptual entity.” 
24. Independently of both the speech acts that formulate propositions or norms and the
speech acts that interpret (ascribe meaning to) descriptive or prescriptive formulations.
See Caracciolo 2009: 183 ss., 1996: 223 ss. Caracciolo’s tenets are discussed in Guastini
2016. 
25. Sure,  propositions  and  norms  can  be  conceived  not  as  linguistic,  but  as  mental
entities: objects (or products) of thinking. In such a case, however, neither are entities
susceptible of knowledge – and in this sense not “existing” – before their formulation in a
language. 
26. Berto 2010: ch. IV; Hernández Marín1998: 41. 
27. Hernández Marín 1998: 50: “a proposition is the sense of a sentence; in absence of
sentences, there are no propositions [...] for a semantic entity to exist, there must be an
expression of which the former is a sense or meaning” (the original is in Spanish). This
view can be traced back to Quine 1961.
28. Moreover,  no  meanings  without  interpretive  (i.e.,  meaning-ascribing)  acts.  See
Scarpelli’s (1985: 570) quote at the end of the previous section. Interpretation, namely
legal interpretation, however, is a subject for a different paper. 
29. This is the view of natural law doctrines. See Bobbio1965: ch. VIII (natural law theory
understood as a cognitivist meta-ethics).
30. Legal non-cognitivism is nothing other than legal positivism. (Nowadays, it is also
called “the thesis of the social sources of law”.)
31. Scarpelli 1989: 461.
32. This is the concept of the “factual existence” of a norm, which must not be confused
with the “legal existence” of a norm. As I have said already, the articulation of a norm
and its introduction into a legal system are two different things. See Guastini 2010: ch.
XXIV. Different concepts of the existence of norms (including their factual existence) are
discussed in Bulygin 1995: 200 ss.; Alchourrón & Bulygin 2007: 221 ss.
33. Kelsen 1989. Von Wright (1963: 116) put it well: “prescriptions originate, come into
existence, through a peculiar mode of human action”.
34. Bulygin 2010: 285. 
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35. However, in the legal domain, only expressed norms originate from norm-producing
acts,  since  jurists  admit  the  existence  of  non-expressed (so-called  “implicit”)  norms,
derived form the expressed ones by means of various arguments (some of which are
deductive, but most of which are non-deductive, such as the argument a contrario or the
argument by analogy). 
36. González Lagier 2001: 66.
37. It is a matter of course that norms have a temporal existence within a legal system,
since any legal norm can be derogated and/or declared null and void, and in this way lose
its (legal) existence.
38. Tarello 1974.
39. Norms  are  interpreted  sentences  according  to  Alchourrón  &  Bulygin  1971.  That
means, if I understood correctly, that the existence of a norm depends on the existence of
both  normative  sentences  and  their  interpretation.  ee981/1991a,  1984/1991b  and
1989/1991c.use of languageon), and the deontic statusresseegs.
40. I  am alluding here to the distinction between two senses of “interpretation”: one
referring to the interpretive activity, the other to its product. See Tarello 1976.
41. One could say that, in this sense, the existence of a norm depends on language twice:
on the one hand, it is dependent on a speech act of formulation, on the other hand, it is
dependent  on  the  speech  act  of  interpretation.  Guastini  2014b:  303  ss.  ee981/1991a,
1984/1991b and 1989/1991c.use of languageon), and the deontic statusresseegs.
ABSTRACTS
The author analyses the distinction between the hyletic and the expressive conception of norms.
His  main  goal  is  to  reject  Alchourrón  and  Bulygin's thesis  that  these  conceptions  offer  two
incompatible solutions to one single problem. He argues that these conceptions deal with two
different and partially independent issues. One issue regards the “genesis of norms”, that is, the
process of their production. The other issue regards the “nature of norms” and, therefore, the
product  of  that  process.  The  author  concludes  that  these  conceptions  aren’t  necessarily
incompatible, even though one’s proposed solution to one of the problems somehow conditions
her response to the other problem.
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